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Abstract
Our objective is to study, in a labor market characterized by search frictions, the effects of
technological progress on the average quality of the job matches. We will see as results
that the effects of technological progress on the labor market depend upon the initial
conditions of the economy. If the economy is totally characterized by the presence of
low-quality job matches, an increase in the technological progress is accompanied by an
increase in the average quality of jobs. In turn, if the economy is totally characterized by
the presence of high-quality job matches, an increase in the technological progress rate
implies the reverse effect. Finally, if the economy is totally characterized by the presence
of very high-quality jobs, an increase in the technological progress rate implies an
increase in the average quality of the job matches.
Resumo
Nosso objetivo neste artigo é o de estudar, em um mercado de trabalho caracterizado por
fricções, os efeitos de variações na taxa de progresso tecnológico sobre a qualidade média
das parcerias produtivas. Veremos, como resultados do modelo, que os efeitos de
variações na taxa de progresso tecnológico sobre o mercado de trabalho dependerão das
condições iniciais da economia. Se a economia for totalmente caracterizada pela presença
de parcerias produtivas de baixa qualidade, então uma variação positiva na taxa de
progresso tecnológico virá acompanhada de um aumento na qualidade média dos
empregos. Por sua vez, se a economia for totalmente caracterizada pela presença de
parcerias produtivas de alta qualidade, uma variação positiva na taxa de progresso
tecnológico virá acompanhada de uma redução na qualidade média dos empregos.
Finalmente, se a economia for totalmente caracterizada pela presença de parcerias
produtivas de elevadíssima qualidade, um aumento na taxa de progresso tecnológico virá
acompanhado de um aumento na qualidade média dos empregos. Finally, if the economy
is totally characterized by the presence of very high-quality jobs, an increase in the
technological progress rate implies an increase in the average quality of the job matches.
Palavras-Chave: Criação e Destruição de Empregos, Progresso Tecnológico.
Keywords: Job Creation, Job Destruction and Technological Progress.
Área ANPEC: 5
JEL Classification: J64, O33 e O49.1.   Introduction
A model for the labor market has to be able to explain several aspects related to job
creation and job destruction dynamics. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), for
example, found that job creation and destructions flows are typically high, heterogeneous,
and asymmetric and that the job destruction process is the one which normally dictates
job changes
1. In other words, according to these authors, a labor market model should
explain that, independently of the current economic state, job creation and job destruction
flows are normally high, distinct for different sectors and periods, and that the destruction
process should be the main responsible for the changes in the job match characteristics.
Apart from these facts, the authors also argued that a labor market model should be able
to explain that the best job matches present lower creation and destruction rates and that
the break ups are, in a great majority, driven by worker decisions, if the matches are of
high quality, and by firms if they are of low quality.
Based on these empirical evidences
2, several studies were conducted in an attempt to
explain some of these facts, determining their consequences over particular aspects of the
labor market as, for example, the evolution of the average job quality.
Caballero and Hammour (1994), for example, formalized the idea that recessions are
periods of high job destruction and low job creation flows, and that if considered
together, the result should be an increase in the average match quality. According to these
authors during a recession there is a process of elimination of the less productive jobs
from the market. The idea was that these periods are characterized by a cleansing effect
whereby the least efficient jobs would be the first ones to be eliminated, only the most
productive jobs remaining in the market
3. However, although Caballero and Hammour
showed the consequences of a recession over the average quality of jobs, their results do
not have empirical support, as Bowlus (1995) demonstrated.
Bowlus found, with and empirical analysis of the evolution of job quality in the US, that
what is happening is precisely the opposite of what Caballero and Hammour suggested.
In other words, Bowlus observed that recessions are periods not only of no improvement,
but actual deterioration in the average quality of matches
4.
Based on these findings, Barlevy (2002) considered, in addition to the effect of a
recession over job destruction, the effects of recessions over the job creation dynamics.
This author argued that considering on-the-job search, we would have the creation of an
additional effect, empirically stronger than the one proposed by Caballero and Hammour,
which he denominated sullying effect.
The idea defended by Barlevy was that recessions were periods characterized by low
quality job creation. In this way, if these effects overcome those generated by the
destruction dynamics, we would have a reduction, and not an improvement, in the
average quality of job matches.
                                                
1 Shimer (2005) argues that the job creation process is the one that drives the job changes.
2 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) approached the facts for the U.S. economy. See Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999b) for OECD countries.
3 The papers by Hall (1991) and (2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Gomes, Greenwood and
Rebelo (1999) support this argument.
4 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) also found these empirical facts in the US, while Fernandez (2004)
verified it for Spain.However, although Barlevy demonstrated the reduction in the average quality of jobs
during recessions, the proposed dynamics goes against the stylized fact proposed by
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh that the job destruction process must be the main
responsible for the characteristics of the existing jobs in the market.
In order to address this issue, this paper has as its principal goal the study of average job
quality, bearing in mind the greater importance of the destruction dynamics in the
determination of the quality of matches, and that the job destruction process is determined
by workers, if the matches are of high quality, and by the firms, if they are of low quality.
The proposed model is more closely related to the creative destruction technological
progress model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), with the introduction of
heterogeneity both in job matching quality and in the information set of the worker and
the firm.
The idea behind this last aspect is to consider that the information sets of the worker and
the firm, which are responsible for the individuals’ evaluation of the job quality, do not
coincide.
We will see that these simple changes are enough to create heterogeneity in the job
destruction process and a greater relative importance of the destruction dynamics in basic
job aspects, as argued by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh. We will also see that for specific
parameters and initial conditions, it is possible to create either the sullying or the
cleansing effect proposed by Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Barlevy (2002).
The intuition of the model is that, for the group of low quality matches, an increase in the
technological progress rate implies both an increase in the job destruction flow as well as
a reduction in the job creation dynamics. Taking these two flows into consideration, we
will have a reduction in the average job quality. In turn, for the high-quality matches,
both effects will imply not a reduction, but an increase, in the average quality. Thus, and
considering both previous scenarios, the effect of higher growth rates over the average
job quality will depend on the relative dimension of high versus low job quality intervals.
However, although the present model is compatible with the results of Caballero and
Hammour (1994) and Barlevy (2002), two aspects will differentiate it from those models.
First, in the Barlevy model the sullying effect is the result of a high-low quality job
creation, while in our model this effect is obtained via job destruction dynamics. Second,
in these models the idea of quality is closely related with the notion of job match
productivity, while in our model the concept of quality is associated with the idea of non-
monetary job attributes. In other words, according to Caballero and Hammour (1994) and
Barlevy (2002), an improvement in the average quality of job matches is equivalent to an
improvement in the average match productivity, while in our model an improvement in
the average quality implies a qualitative average improvement, not necessarily implying
any change in the average productivity. In this way, the heterogeneity proposed by the
model is equivalent to differences in match attributes, which create value, both for the
worker as well as for the firm, without implying any change in the match productivity.
This chapter is organized in the following way. In the next section we will characterize
the cleansing and sullying effects. In the following section we will develop a theoretical
model, and in the fourth section we will see the main results obtained concerning the
effect of changes in technological progress rate over the average job matching quality. In
the final section we will see the main conclusions.2.  Cleansing and Sullying Effects
The technological progress dynamics of creative destruction type implies the existence of
a constant process of creation and destruction of job matches due to the hypothesis that
only the most-recently jobs have the highest level of technology. In other words, the idea
behind the Schumpterian growth models is that new job matches are located on the
technological frontier. However, the only way of updating an already existing job match
is via the destruction of this relationship and formation of a new one.
With this idea in mind, Caballero and Hammour (1994) studied the effects of lower
technological progress rates over the average quality of job matches. They found that
there are two flows acting simultaneously over the labor market during periods of low
growth. On one side, there is an increase in the job destruction dynamics, as the matches
with older technology suffer a rise in the probability of becoming unproductive and being
destroyed. However, on the other side, there is a reduction in the job creation process, as
it is less advantageous for the firms to create new job matches during periods of lower
growth.
The main goal of Caballero and Hammour was to determine which of these effects
prevailed during less favorable periods of economic growth. The basic result obtained
was that during periods of low growth there is a cleansing effect acting over the labor
market which created an average improvement in the quality of job matches. In other
words, the authors noted that during low-growth periods the job destruction flow exceeds
the job creation, creating an average rise in the quality of the ongoing job matches.
The authors also found that it was to be expected that an efficient economy would
concentrate all its creation and destruction processes in these periods, since the
opportunity cost of job match restructuring would be more beneficial in less-favorable
periods. Similar results were also obtained by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Gomes,
Greenwood and Rebelo (2001), Hall (1991) and Hall (2000).
In another scenario, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) considered both the effects of
aggregate and specific shocks over the dynamics of creation and destruction of jobs. The
authors detected a negative correlation between job creation and job destruction processes
during periods of recession, and that the destruction flow appeared to have a more volatile
dynamic than the job creation flow, a result closely related to those obtained by Caballero
and Hammour.
In still another model, Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001) found that when explicitly
introducing a rule of acceptance and rejection of a job match, together with the existence
of incomplete markets, in a model that considers aggregate and specific shocks, the result
would be an improvement in the average quality of matches, similar to the findings of
Caballero and Hammour.
In turn, Hall (1991, 2000) also approached the effect of low growth rates in a creative
destruction scenario on job matches, obtaining an increase in the unemployment rate
followed by an improvement in the average quality of job matches.
However, although all these authors have modeled that the consequences of a recession
over the average quality of job matches would be negative, these results were not
empirically supported, as Bowlus (1995), Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) and
Fernandez (2004) demonstrated. According to these authors, the average quality of
matches is not negatively, but rather positively related with economic growth rates. Thus,we can expect deterioration in the average quality of jobs during periods of recession and
an improvement in their quality during good periods.
Based on these empirical results, Barlevy (2002) showed that the simple introduction of
on-the-job search in a job matching model would be enough to obtain results different
from those defended by Caballero and Hammour, although more compatible with the
empirical evidence.
Barlevy argued that during a recession there were two processes acting simultaneously in
the labor market. On one hand, there was an increase in the destruction of less-efficient
jobs, which gave way to the cleansing effect proposed by Caballero and Hammour. On
the other hand, there was a process of low-quality job creation that gave way to an
additional effect over the labor market that Barlevy denominated sullying effect.
In other words, the idea defended by Barlevy was that during a recession there were two
effects acting in opposing directions in the labor market. On one side of the market, via
destruction dynamics, there was an elimination of the less-efficient job matches, while on
the other side, there was a process of creation of less-efficient job matches and more
workers were stuck in mediocre matches. In this way, the final result would depend on
the magnitude of these two fluxes. If the low-quality job creation dynamics exceed the
destruction process we will have a reduction in the average quality of job matches.
The model of Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo’s model argues for a cleansing effect
during periods of recessions, they maintain that the model is also compatible with the
sullying effect proposed by Barlevy. According to them, this effect occurs because during
recessions the worker obtains reduction in his rent, which in turn implies an increase in
the probability that the worker accepts job offers with lower wages, creating job matches
with lower quality.
3.  Theoretical Model
In this section we will present the characteristics of our theoretical model. The modeled
scenario is founded on Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) technological progress model
with the inclusion of heterogeneity, both in match quality and the information set of the
worker and firm in the evaluation of the expected quality of jobs.
Agents and Preferences. The economy is formed by a constant population of workers,
who live infinitely, and a great number of firms that together give rise to the production
activity. Firms and workers are heterogeneous, neutral to risk and maximize the
discounted expected present value of rents, subject to the available information.
Suppose transferable utility, the existence of a perfect capital market and that the worker
and firm discount the future at an exogenous and constant rate r
5.
Each firm has only one job position, which can be occupied or not, and employs only one
worker at each moment. In turn, each worker can be employed in only one job per period
or unemployed.
                                                
5 See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2004) on the non-transferable utility theme.Search and Production. Before the beginning of production, firms and workers
undertake an individual, independent and expensive process of search. Let  () Ptc  be the
search cost for the firms, where  ()
gt Pt e =  represents a common factor of growth.
Assume that there is no on-the-job search and that the quantity of job matches formed per
period is given by function  () , mvu non-negative, concave, homogeneous of degree one
and increasing in its two arguments, where v represents the vacancy rate and u  the
quantity of unemployed workers in the economy, per period.
The unemployed workers move to an employment situation according to a rate  () q θθ ,
where θ  is the ratio of v and u , while a job vacancy becomes occupied at a rate  () q θ .
Before production begins, firms fix their technology at the cost  () PtK . Assume that it is
irreversible and is in the technological frontier at the moment that the match is formed
6.
Note that with this technological progress format, since a job match, once created, cannot
be updated, its production will remain constant at its initial level,τ .
Suppose that the occupied jobs can be destroyed due to an idiosyncratic shock that
follows a Poisson Process with arrival rateλ , which aims to capture, for example, any
negative exogenous events that affect the productivity of a particular job matching.
Observe from the two previous conditions that a particular job match can be destroyed
due to an aggregate shock, represented by larger growth rates that affect the obsolescence
rate of all existing job matches, or due to a specific shock, which acts individually over a
particular job match.
Every occupied match has two components that affect its value for the firm. The first one
is given by  () Px τ , and represents the production generated by a job match formed in τ .
The second one is represented by the term α  and aims to capture differences in quality of
the job matches created at the same moment τ 7.
Assume that α  is time invariant and uniquely determined at the moment that the match is
formed, in an exogenous and independent way, from a particular distribution function.
Suppose also that it is an experience good, that is, it can only be known after the
beginning of production
8, and that the firm and the worker have different information
sets
9 in the evaluation of the expected value of α .
If, apart from the previous conditions, we consider that at any time both firms and
workers can terminate the ongoing job match, that is, they can break up the partnership
and return to the search process in order to find a new partner, we have that jobs created
at each moment will have distinct obsolescence periods, according to their quality and the
technological progress rate.
                                                
6 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) and Pissarides (2000) for a different formulation of the technological
progress.
7 We will consider that, although a higher matching quality does not affect the job productivity, it affects
the effective discount rate. In other words, we will consider that the higher the job quality, the less the value
of the match will be discounted, as workers and firms prefer a good job in relation to a lower quality one.
8 Note that the condition that α  is an experience good implies that all meetings will give rise to job
matches, since there is no rejection before production starts.
9 The idea of this condition is to consider that workers and firms do not valuate the expected value of α  in
the same way.Note that the idea behind the previous condition on α  is that before the formation of a
job match two workers (firms) are seen in an identical way by the firms (workers) and
only after the production starts does the quality of the job match start to be revealed.
Suppose, in order to facilitate the presentation of the main results of the model, that α  is
defined in the interval:







Wages. If a productive match is destroyed by the worker, by the firm or even in an
exogenous way, both the worker and the firm have to pay the costs related to the return to
the search process. In this way, a productive match generates a surplus that has to be
distributed among the two parties. Let us suppose that this division is determined from
the  Generalized Nash Bargain Process between the firm and the worker, whereβ
represents the workers’ bargaining power
10.
Equilibrium.  Let  () Vt represent the present discounted value for a firm of the expected
gains from a job vacancy created at t,  () , Jt τ  the present discounted value for a firm of
the expected gains associated with a job created at τ , with quality α  and occupied in
period  t,  () Ut the present discounted value for the worker of the expected gains
associated with the unemployment, and  () , Wt τ  the present discounted value for the
worker of the expected gains associated with a job created at τ , with quality α , in period
t. Thus we have:
(2)           () () ( )() ( ) () () 1, ( )
e
F rV t P t c q J t t V t P t K V t θα
•
 =− + + − − +  ;
(3)           () ( ) () () ( ) () ( ) ,, , 1 , ( , ) rJ t P x w t J t J t V t J t τττ α τ λ α τ τ
•
=−+ − + − +   ;
(4)           () () ( )() () ( ) 1, ( )
e
W rU t P t b q W t t U t U t θθ α
•
 =+ + −+  ;
(5)           () () () ( )() ( ) ,, , 1 , ( , ) rW t w t W t W t U t W t ττ α τ λ α τ τ
•
=+ − + − +   ;
where 
e
F α  represents the expected quality of the job match for the firm
11;  () , wt τ  the
worker’s wage rate, at moment t, in a match formed at τ ;  () Ptb  is the job opportunity
cost for the worker, while the last terms represent, respectively, time variations in  () Vt,
() , Jt τ ,  () Ut and  () , Wt τ .
                                                
10 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) for alternative formulations of the wage determination.
11 Suppose that 
ee
F αα =  and 
ee
W αα ξ =− , where ξ  is a small term that represents the deviations in
the worker’s expectations in relation to the firm’s expectations.Note that with these value function specifications the job quality component enters in a
proportional manner in  (,) Wt τ  and  (,) Jt τ . Thus, the term associated with the job quality
depends on α  and on the present discounted value of the expected gains associated with
an occupied job for the worker and for the firm,  (,) Wt τ  and  (,) Jt τ .
The main reason behind this formulation is to consider that the effects created by the
quality of a match directly affect the workers’ and firms’ valuations of the job matching.
In other words, we are considering that the higher the job matching quality, the less it will
be discounted, since it is preferred to a lower quality match.
Also note, from expression (2), that when a vacancy is occupied it will generate a gain
given by the difference between the value of a vacancy and the value of an occupied job,
plus the gains associated with the expected quality of the match to be formed.
In turn, we can verify from expression (4) that once the worker is employed, he will have
a gain given by the difference between the value of employment and the value of
unemployment, plus the gains associated with the expected quality of the match to be
formed.
Continuing the equilibrium characterization, we will assume that  () 1 rg λα λ +− − > and
bx < , in a way that the effective discount rate is positive and there are strictly positive
advantages in the formation of a job match, as results from job search theory.
Considering the usual hypothesis of free entry, we have from (2), that













where we can see that the expected value of a new job match is equal to the sum of the
cost of occupying a vacancy, expressed in terms of the rate at which this vacancy is
occupied, and the cost to create this new vacancy.
Now, as the surplus generated by the matching is divided according to the Generalized
Nash Bargaining Solution,  ( , ) wt τ  satisfies:
(7)           ( ) () ( ) ( ) () ,1 , Jt V t Wt U t βτ β τ −= − −       .
Using expressions (3) - (7), and assuming 
ee e
FW ααα == , the wage rate at moment t, in
a match formed at τ , is given by:
(8)           ( ) () ( ) () () ()() () ,1 wt P x P t t t τβ τ β δ θ ω θ =+ − ,
where  () () t δθ  and  () () t ωθ  are given by
12:
                                                
12 Suppose, to simplify the presentation of the basic results of the model, that the terms defined in














(10)           () () ()
1
tb c K q
β
ωθ θ θ θ
β

=+ +    − 
.
We can observe from the previous expressions that the wage rate is formed by two terms.
The first is associated with the worker’s productivity, and the second is related to his
outside options.
We can also observe from the previous expression that the greater the technological
progress rate, the greater will be the worker’s wage rate, due to the growth verified in the
term related to his outside option, and that the greater α  is, the less will be the wage
growth, for a given technological progress rate.
Note also that the greater 
e α  and θ , the greater will be the wage growth, for a given
technological progress rate. The reason for the first effect is that as 
e α  increases, the
greater will be the expected quality obtained in a new job match, giving way to an
increase in the worker’s wage rate in his current job. In turn, the greater θ  is, the greater
will be the ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers, which implies greater wage rates,
due to the congestion effect
13.
Another interesting aspect that we observe is that the worker’s outside option increases at
the technological progress rate, while the wage rate increases at a lower rate. As a
consequence, there will be a moment 
W T  at which the worker will terminate his current
match, as his outside option becomes greater than his wage.
In turn, as the worker’s wage grows at a rate proportional to the technological progress
rate, while the productivity of the job remains constant, there will be a moment 
F T  where
the worker’s productivity is lower than his wage, implying the destruction of the job
match by the firm.
Thus, 
W T  and 
F T  represent the moments at which the worker and the firm destroy the
job match, respectively.
Using expressions (3) to (5), together with equation (8) and conditions 
ee
F αα =  and
ee
W αα ξ =− , we have that 
F T  and 
W T  are determined by
14:
(11)
() ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ()() ()







JtM a x Px P s s se d s
τ
λα λ τβ τ β δ θ ω θ
+
−+ − − −      =− − −  
  ∫
                                                
13 The idea behind the congestion effect is that as θ  grows, the probability of a firm occupying a vacancy
decreases, while the probability on an unemployed worker finding a vacancy increases.
14 The term  o δ  is identical to δ , except that the denominator is  () ()
e rq θθα ξ −− . (12)
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We can observe from the previous expressions that 
F T  and 
W T  coincide, respectively,
with the moment where the value of an occupied job is zero for the firm, and the moment
where the value of the employment equals the value of unemployment for the worker.
Considering  t τ =  in the previous expressions, the first order conditions of the previous
optimization problems are, respectively
15:
(14)          () () 11 0
F gT xe ββ δ ω −− − = ,
(15)           () 10
W gT
o xe βω ϕ δ β δ −− − =   ,
where δ , ω  and ϕ  are given by expressions (9), (10) and (13) respectively.
Note, from the two previous expressions, that the optimal moments 
W T  and 
F T  diminish
with higher values of θ . The reason for this behavior is that the larger θ  is, the higher
will be the worker’s wage, implying a reduction in 
F T . In turn, the greater θ  is, the
higher will be the worker’s outside option, which implies a lower 
W T .
We can also observe that 
W T  and 
F T  decrease with higher technological progress rates
and 
W T  increases with higher positive values of ξ .
Finally, we can observe from these expressions that 
W T  diminishes with greaterα , while
F T  increases. The reason for this behavior is that the higher α  is, the lower will be wage
rate growth, if compared with the increase seen in the worker’s outside option, which will
make the obsolescence of the job match faster for the worker. On the contrary, greater α
makes the obsolescence of the job match slower for the firm, as we can see in the figures
below.
                                                
15 Note that, in order to have strictly positive 
F T  and 
W T ,  0 o x δω >>  and  () 10 x βϕ β δ ω >− − >   .Note from the above figures that the greater α  is, the higher will be the present
discounted value of the expected gain given by the job match to the worker and to the
firm. However, as time goes on, the higher quality job will more quickly lose its value for
the worker, and more slowly lose its value for the firm, if compared with a job of low
quality.
Proposition 1  Let  I α  be the value of α  that makes 
FW TT = . Thus, when:
(a)           I αα ≤ , the job match will exist, at most, until 
F T ;
(b)           I αα ≥ , the job match will exist, at most, until 
W T .
Proof.  We need only to equal 
F T  and 
W T  to obtain an expression for  I α .
The idea behind proposition 3.1 is the following. If α  is given by  I α  we will have
FW TT = . However, as α  is lower than  I α  we will have 
FW TT <  and, in this case, the







































() Uthave the opposite scenario, that is, we will have 
FW TT >  and, in this case, the worker
will be the agent to destroy the job match.
In other words, for different values of α  we will have different agents initiating the
destruction dynamics. If α  is lower than  I α  the expression that determines 
W T  loses its
importance in the equilibrium characterization, since the destruction of the job match will
be 
F T , a moment that happens earlier than 
W T . In turn, if α  is above  I α  the expression
that determines 
F T  loses its importance in the equilibrium characterization, since the
moment of destruction will be 
W T , a moment that happens earlier than 
F T , as we can see
in the figure below.
Continuing with the equilibrium characterization, when considering  t τ = , ( , ) ( ) Jtt PtJ =
and the optimum 
F T  in (11), we have that





rt gt Jx e e d t
λα λ βδ ω
−+ − −    =− −  ∫
represents the value of a job created at moment t and which will survive, if there is no
exogenous destruction, up to moment 
F T .
Using ( , ) ( ) Jtt PtJ =  in (6), we have that (16) and












determine the job creation dynamics.
These expressions tell us that the expected gains to the firm from a new job match must
equal the expected costs associated with the creation of a new vacancy.










Job DestructionNote that, for given α , the expressions (14) – (17) determine the equilibrium in the T –
θ  space
16.
Having characterized the job creation and destruction dynamics, we must now obtain the
expression that determines the equilibrium unemployment rate.
The job creation flow, at moment t, is given by:
(18)           ()( ) JC q u t θθ = ,
where ( ) ut represents the unemployment rate, while the job destruction flow, at moment
t, is given by:
(19)           () 1
T JD u t e JC
λ λ
− =− +   ;           ,
FW TTT = ,
where the term  () 1 ut λ −     represents the job destruction flow which comes from the
exogenous process and 
T e
λ −  measures the fraction of the job creation flow that survives
up to the destruction moments 
F T  or 
W T , in accordance with the quality of the job
match. Therefore, from the two last expressions, the equilibrium unemployment rate is
given by:









,           ,
FW TTT = .
Observe from this expression that the further α  distances itself from  I α , above or below,
the quicker will be the job match destruction as 
F T  or 
W T  diminishes, in accordance with
the direction that α  moves, leading to an increase in the equilibrium unemployment
rate
17. Thus, as the quality of the match distances itself from the quality  I α , even in the
direction of better qualities, the result will be an increase in the unemployment rate.
The basic reason for a higher job destruction rate in better qualities job matches is due to
the fact that these types of jobs are less sensitive to what happens in the market. In this
way, although a good quality job matching is preferable to a lower quality one, these jobs
will be quickly destroyed, since the workers wage rate in these jobs do not follow the
average increases in the wage rate.
Extension. Now we will see that it is possible to enrich the previous model in order to
obtain more interesting results, according to the job match characteristics.
As the model developed up to now does not consider the reaction of an agent when the
other part decides to destroy the job match, we will introduce the idea that the results of
such an action can be adverse enough that the agent affected by the destruction interferes
in the process, avoiding the destruction of the job match
18.
                                                
16 See Pissarides (2000) for details.
17 Auer, Efendioglu and Leschke (2004) also found this empirical relationship.
18 Note that we are assuming with this scenario that there is no rigidity in downward wage movements.Now, observe that in order to analyze the best response of an agent to the destruction
decision of the other, we need to compare the value that this agent receives if such a
decision were not taken by the other one.
Let us consider in this section that ε  is positive. Now, as ε  is the term that makes
ee
WF αα ≠  and, when considered in the job destruction dynamics, makes 
FW TT ≠ ,
considering it to be positive implies that the only case to analyze is 
FW TT < . In this way,
following this condition, at the moment 
F T (at which the firm decides to destroy the job
match) the value of the employment is given by:
(22)           () ( ) ,0
FF JT V T τ == .
Proposition 2  Suppose that 
FW TT < . Thus, whenever the job match quality is given by
M α , that satisfies
()












then it is more advantageous for the worker to maintain the current job match.
Proof.  The value of the unemployment option for the worker at moment 











. Thus, whenever  () ( ) ,
FF WT U T τ >  it is advantageous for the
worker to maintain the present job match.
Manipulating these last two expressions, we arrive at the expression that  M α  must satisfy.
Now, if we consider that it is possible to isolate the best jobs within the group of poor-
quality job matches, and that  () ( ) ,0
FF
o rW T P T τδ ω >> , we have that  M α  is defined in
interval (1).
The intuition of the preceding proposition is the following. If, at the moment that the firm
decides to destroy the job match, the value of the job for the worker is higher than his
outside option, then the worker will react to the job destruction, by accepting lower
wages. Now, as the value of the job at moment 
F T  is higher than his outside option, we
can expect that the worker will accept a wage rate reduction in order to maintain his
current job match. Thus, whenever the job match is defined in the previous interval, the
job will not be destroyed at 
F T .
Note also that the higher ε  is, the more probable it is that the worker will react to the job
destruction.
Also note that the worker will preserve the matches with lower α  because they are, at
this moment, better than a high quality one – although they do not have good quality, they
pay high wages.
Therefore, if the job match belongs to the lowest quality subgroup among those of lower
quality, it will not be destroyed at 
F T , but will last until the moment 
W T . In turn, if thejob has quality between  M α  and  I α , the job will be destroyed at 
F T , as we can see in the
figure below.
4.   Technological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality
In this section we will examine the effects of technological progress rate changes over the
average quality of the job matches.
Assume initially that the economy is completely characterized by job matches defined in
the interval of quality  M I αα α ≤<. In this case, we have that T  is determined by
expression (14) and we can observe that as  g  grows 
F T  falls, or in other words, as the
technological progress rate grows, the quicker it is that firms will destroy the existing job
matches. The reason for this behavior is that the greater g  is, the higher will be the wage
growth, and as the job has low quality, the quicker it will become obsolete, leading to its
destruction.
In turn, regarding the job creation dynamics, as g  grows, the less pronounced will be this
process, because higher wages will be paid in those new jobs.
In this way, we will have as a final result an increase in the job destruction and a
reduction in the job creation dynamics. Now, as the destruction occurs from the worst to
the best job matches, the worst quality jobs will be the first to be destroyed, leading to an
increase in the average quality of the existing matches in the interval   M I αα α ≤<.
Note also that if instead of an increase, there is a decrease in the technological progress
rate, the result will be, as before, an increase in the average job match quality.
The idea now is that we have a reduction in the job destruction process and an increase in
the job creation dynamics. However, the job creation flow would lead to the creation, in
an independent manner, of job matches in the previous interval. In this way, we can
expect no changes in the job quality coming from the job creation side. Furthermore, as
the destruction dynamics follow the same process, that is, the jobs with less quality are
the first to be destroyed, we will again have an increase in the average quality of job
matches.
M α I α
Worker destroys    Firm destroys Worker destroys
α
FIGURE 4
Job DestructionNow, consider the job matches defined in the interval  M αα < . In this case we will have
T  determined by the expression (15) and as g  grows, 
W T  falls, that is, the quicker it is
that the worker wishes to destroy the job match.
The reason now is that the wage rate does not respond to every increase in the worker’s
outside option, which leads him to destroy his current job match sooner.
In turn, on the job creation side, the results are identical to those previously obtained.
Thus, an increase in g  implies an increase in the job destruction flow and a reduction in
the job creation dynamics. However, there will be a difference in relation to the earlier
results. As the workers destroy the jobs with greater α  followed by the jobs with smaller
α , the destruction process will generate opposite results, that is, we will have the job
matches being destroyed from the best to the worst ones, leading to a reduction in the
average quality of the job matches. Therefore, whenever we consider the jobs defined in
the interval  M αα < , the increase in the job destruction will be accompanied by a
worsening in the average quality of the matches.
Now observe that if instead of an increase, there were a reduction in the technological
progress rate, the result would be a reduction in the average quality of the job matches,
according to the previous argument. Thus, as before, we would have the job destruction
process determining the average quality of the matches, although to a lesser degree.
Finally, for the jobs with quality defined in the interval  I αα ≥ , the destruction moment is
again given by the expression (15) and the effect of changes in the technological progress
over the average match quality are identical to those obtained previously for the jobs
defined in the interval  M αα < .
Joining all the previous results, we can see that it is possible to obtain both an
improvement and a worsening in the aggregate quality of the job matches. The final result
will depend on both the distribution of the job matches and the parameters related with
the determination of  M α  and  I α .
5.   Conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to analyze the behavior of the average quality of job
matches, bearing in mind the empirical facts proposed by the literature.
Earlier studies defended distinct arguments as to the effect of periods of low growth over
the average quality. On one hand, it was argued that these periods were characterized by a
cleansing effect, which implied an increase in the average quality of the matches. On the
other hand, it was argued that these periods were not characterized by a cleansing effect,
but rather by a sullying effect. That is, these periods were moments of reduction in the
quality of the matches.
We saw that it is possible to obtain both the cleansing as well the sullying effect,
depending on the distribution of the job matches and on the parameters related with  M α
and  I α . The idea advanced was that variations in the technological progress rate create
distinct dynamics in the job destruction process, depending on the quality of the job
match.
We demonstrated that two simple modifications in the technological progress model of
creative destruction type of Mortensen and Pissarides (in order to allow for the existenceof stochastic job matches and differences in perceptions about the average quality of a
new job match by the involved agents) was enough to explain the behavior of the average
quality of jobs, taking into account the facts that the destruction process must be the main
one responsible for this process and that, depending on the job quality, we will have
different agents driving the destruction dynamics.
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